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IS THERE A GENERAL COMMERCIAL LAW ADMINISTERED BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LAWS OF THE PARTICULAR
STATE IN WHICH THE COURT IS HELD?
THis question arose in the case of Watson v. Torley, 18 How.
517, which was an action against the drawer on a bill of exchange
protested for non-acceptance, and suit brought in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the state of Mississippi before the
time fixed for payment by the bill. The court, by Mr. Justice
DANIEL, there says :-" It is a rule of the commercial law, too
familiarly known to require the citation of authorities, or to admit
of question, that the payee or endorsee of a bill upon its presentment and upon the refusal of the drawer to accept, has the
right to immediate recourse against the drawer. It has been suggested that the instruction by the judge at the Circuit may have
been founded upon a statute of the state of Mississippi of 1836,
wherein it is declared that ' no action or suit shall be sustained or
commenced on any bill of exchange until the maturity thereof.'
The answer to the above suggestion is this: that if such be a just
interpretation of the statute of Mississippi, that interpretation
and the consequences deducible from it we must regard as wholly
inadmissible. In the case of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, Mr. Justice SToRY, delivering the opinion of the court, said : ' It has never
been supposed by us that the 34th section of the Judiciary Act did
apply or was intended to apply to questions of a more general
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nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or' local usages
of a fixed and permanent operation ; as for example to the construction of contracts or other written instruments, and especially
to questions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals
are called upon to perform the like functions with ourselves;
that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies
what is the true exposition of the contract, or what is the just rule
furnished by commercial law to govern the case.
"The general and commercial law being circumscribed within
no local limits, nor committed for its administration to any peculiar jurisdiction, and the Constitution and laws of the United
States having conferred upon the citizens of the several states, an~d
upon aliens, the power or privilege of litigating and enforcing
their rights acquired under and defined by that general commercial law, before the judicial tribunals of the United States, it must
follow by regular consequence, that any state law or regulation,
the effect of which would be to impair the rights thus secured, or
to divest the Federal courts of cognisance thereof, in their fullest
acceptation under the commercial law, must be nugatory and unavailing. A requisition like this would be a violation of the general commercial law, which a state would have no right to impose,
and which the courts of the United States would be bound to disregard."
The section of the Judiciary Act referred to in the foregoing
opinion, and so familiar to the profession, reads as follows: "The
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, Shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in courts
9fthe United States in cases where they apply."
Szift v. Tyson, supra, was an action on a bill of exchange, by
an endorsee against the acceptor; the defence asserting failure of
consideration between original parties, that the bill was taken by
the plaintiff in payment of a pre-existing debt, which it was urged
that the courts of New York held did not constitute a valuable
consideration in the sense of the general rule applicable to negotiable instruments. The bill was accepted and payable in New
York, the suit brought in the Circuit Court for the Sonthern District of that state, and it was contended that under the 34th section of the Judiciary Act the decisions of the courts of New York
should constitute the rule of decision in the cause. These deeiSii.3S
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are not based upon any statute of New York, but on the interpretation by the courts of that state of a rule of commercial law.
iwift v. Tyson, so far from furnishing any support for the
opinion so emphatically announced in Watson v. Torpley, in very
terms excludes the case there presented, holding merely that
decisions of the state courts are not embraced in the term "lairs
of the several states" and in the act, and that upon a question of
general law the courts of the United States, while regarding the
decisions of state courts with the highest respect, do not consider
themselves as conclusively bound by them.
The following cases are sometimes referred to as sustaining the
position taken in Watson v. Torpley:
Carpenterv. Prov. Wash. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 511; Poxcraft v.
Alfallett, 4 How. 379; Bobinson v. Gommonwealth Is. Co., 3
Sum. 220; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Cur. 338. But
upon examination these cases will be found to be entirely unaffected by any law peculiar to the state in which they arose, nor
is the question under consideration discussed or adverted to in
either: in them the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is but reiterated,
limiting the conclusive operation of the adjudications of the highest
court in a state upon the courts of the United States held therein,
to those which affect the title to lands, or the construction of the
local statutes or.usages of the state.
It is nevertheless true that there may be excerpted from these
cases, and perhaps some others, general expressions seeming to
assert the existence of a general commercial law administered by
the Federal oourts without regard to the laws of particular states.
As by Mr. Justice STORY, in Carpenter v. Providence Wash.
Ins. Co., supra, "The questions under our consideration are
questions of general commercial law, and depend upon the construction of a policy of insurance, which is by no means local in its
character, or regulated by any local policy or customs."
And in Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Yourger, supra, Mr. Justice
OTvTIS says: "But the insurers insist that the contract in question was made and was to be executed in the state of Massachusetts; and that by nature of the law of that state the insurers had,
under this policy, a right to take possession of the vessel when an
offer of abandonment was made, and seasonably repair and restore
it to the insured, and thus perform their contract.
"It must be admitted that the law of the place of this contract
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determines the rights which the insurers have upon an offer to
abandon. But this being a question not of mere local muitiexal
law. but arising under the law merchant, though this court must
con-ider with unaffected respect the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, yet they are not bindbg on our judgmutnts. and
we have no right to coitf-iriu to them -when we believe they do n(.,t
announce the true rule. The laws of the place of contract being
the general law merchant, I am bound to declare that, in miy
opinion, it does not confer the right claimed by the underwriters."
This is correct doctrine, and though we think, inaptly expressed,
is yet susceptible of explanation that entirely consists with the
text. The law merchant, or general commercial law, is the law of
the contract in question, because it is. as a part of the common
law, the law of the state of 'Massachusetts when the contract was
made and to be performed, and has not been changed by any
statute of that state; and not because there is any general commercial law known to the courts of the United States as a part of
our Federal system.
It is true, these cases have not adverted to the source of the rule
by which the law-merchant becomes applicable in the courts of the
United States, uor was there any apparent reason why they should
do so, for in them, the questions raised being unaffected by statute,
were properly to be decided in conformity with the general law.
An examination of all the cases will develop that "Vatson,v.
Torpley was without precedent authority, and remains without
subsequent confirmation, and in that case, though the question
was within the record, its decision seems not to have been coisidered by the court as necessary to the cause; it was made without
the benefit of argument from counsel, and Swift v. Tyson relied
upon and largely quoted from, furnishes no foundation for the
superstructure thus professedly erected upon it. Whatever weight
may properly attach to the case as authority in inferior tribunals.
yet the question certainly remains one which the Supreme Court
of the United States may, without impinging upon the settled
doctrines of the court, in a proper case, re-examine and dceicle in
1,0rformity with principle, and it is in this light we propose submitti 'g a few remarks upon the question rather than the case.
Perhaps every state ini the Union has deemed it expedient to
affirm or vary rules of the commercial law; this has arisen som,
times from the co:ceptiCet that the various changes and modifica-
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tions which that branch of our law has undergone in the process
of its assimilation to the ever-varying exigences of commercial
transactions in the course of the past century, were not, or might
not be considered as in force in a particular state by reason merely
of its adoption of the common law, that term being used in America to designate a system of laws that antedates the introduction, or the announcement at least, of many of the most wise and
useful of the rules of the commercial law in their present application. Again: there is an unfortunate conflict of decisions upon
some of the most important questions of commercial law, entering
into the most ordinary transactions of-life, and these, in the absence of any tribunal to which such differences could be referred,
it has doubtless been thought fit to settle by statute; moreover, on
peculiar views of policy, in some instances, fixed rules of the commercial law have been boldly abrogated, and other rules, deemed
more conformable with the institutions of the state and the interests of the people, have been established by statute.
Statutes, however, can constitute but a small part of the laws
of any state. :No statute that was ever penned could be enforced
unless we presupposed an existing system of laws and of procedure. Besides the statutes of a state, and as a part of its laws,
every state possesses itg local customs and usages of merchants,
and that noble heritage of laws which sprang from the genius of
the race, is inscribed in their history, and of which no circumstance
short of their own consent or subjugation can ever divest them.
Such are the laws of the states.
We are thence led to inquire, what are the laws of the United
States? "There can be no common law of the Union. The
Federal Government is composed of sovereign states, each of which
may have its local usages, customs and common law. There is no
principle which pervades the Union and has the authority of law,
that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union.
The common law could be made a part of our Federal system only
by legislative adoption. If a common-law right is asserted in a
court of the United States, such court must look to the laws of
the state in which the case arose :" Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591;
Kendall v. United States, 12 Id. 524; Scott v. Lunt, 7 Id. 596;
Man N'ess et al. v. Pacord,2 Id. 137.
With respect to the construction of the 84th section of the
Judiciary Act, it has repeatedly been held "to be no more than
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what the law would have been without it, to wit: that tne (,h lui
must be the governing rule of private right undor whatever jurisdiction private life comes to be examined." Hawkinsv. Barn y's
Lessee, 5 Pet. 464; Weyman v. Soutlqd, 10 Wheat. 1. Wi.:at,
then is this system of general commercial law independent of the law
of the states? When and where did it originate? What lcgislative
body is competent to alter it ? What tribunal speaks authoritativeiv
upon it? These inquiries must admit of answer with respect to eve'y
system of laws and every principle having the authority of lai.
The supposed existence of such a system of general conunercial
law is a purely American idea, one not to be found in the writings
of the learned commentators foreign or domestic, and only in dcisions of the Federal courts have we the intimation. If a subject
of Great Britain should sue a citizen of Pennsylvania in the Circuit
Court of the United States for that state, upon a contract made
and to be performed in Philadelphia. and if the case of Jlartson v.
Topley is sound in principle, the laws of Pennsylvania affecting
the contract might be disregarded by the court, and the Englis;h
cases possibly looked to as authority upon the mooted question.
But let the case be changed, and upon the same contract the citizen of Pennsylvania sues the British subject in the courts of thai
kingdom, it does not even suggest itself to the mind as a questior
that there might be a hopeless endeavor on the part of those court.
to find in the shadowy region which has been termed general corn
mercial law sonme rule whereby the contract should be adjudicated
but on the contrary and obviously, inquiry would there he made
upon all questions affecting the validity, the construction and th
obligation of the contract, into the laws of Pennsylvania. An
unquestionably when a contract made and to be performed in Eig
land is sued in the courts of the United States, it is to be decide,
in all of these respects, in conformity with the laws of England-statute and other.
The rule of the lex loci is not peculiar to the commercial law,
is of general application, is a part of the body of our law, iSC,
mcdent with obvious justice, is well understood and has ever be(
found adequate for convenience in affairs.
It is the peculiar honor of our commercial law that it is progre-six-e, continually adjusting it.'.elf to meet new questions arising ,
of newly devised transactions, and to conform with changet us:t
znd more enlightened views of general convenience. After Lor
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HOLT-had repeatedly decided that an action could not be sustained
in the name of the assignee of a note payable to order, the question
continued to be presented to him until at length he said, "I perceive a disposition on the part of the merchants of Lombard Street
to dictate the law upon this subject to this court, and I tell them
that it will not be endured."
Parliament, however, afterwards
yielded to the 4emand by the enactment of 3d and 4th Anne, ch.
9. Acquiescence up to that time in the decisions of Lord HOLT and
the aimost universal re-enactment of those statutes by the legislatures of our several states, whether or not proving the correctness
of those decisions, afterwards controveited by Lord MANSFIELD, do
at least make pparent what was then understood to be, and had
the authority of law. This is but a single illustration showing to
how great an extent the commercial law, as now administered, is
the creature of statute and of local usages; otherwise there could
exist no correspondence between the progress of a people in commercial affairs and the adaptation of the law to the requirements
of that progress.
Indeed the courts of the United States are constantly accustomed to act with reference to state laws, upon the doctrine of the
l.x loci, without question. A few only of the very numerous cases
of this class are here cited: Boyce v. -dward, 4 Pet. 111; Brabston v. Gri'son, 9 How. 263; Ish v. Mills, 1 Cr. 0. 0. 567;
Rainbridge v. Wilcox, Baldw. 536.
Although the 34th section of the Judiciary Act has no reference
to causes in admiralty, we nevertheless find that it was the constant
practice of the Federal courts to enforce state statutes in matters
maritime before the sanctionary rule of 1844, and continuously
down to the period of the prohibitory rule of 1850.
While we think that the laws of the states of execution and
performance furnish the only true rule, in fact the only intelligible
rule deducible from the common law, for the determination of the
validity of the contract, its construction and the obligation of parties to it, and should deprecate as unwise and inexpedient the
establishment, whether by the courts or by legislative authority
(though certainly immeasurably more to be regretted in case of the
former than of the latter), of any rule of decision by which the
character of questions here referred to should be decided in disregard of those laws, yet we think it fairly admits of question
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whether Congress may not, under the Constitution, possess such
power.
The Constitution provides that the citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states ; that the judicial power shall extend to controversies between the citizens of the different states and between
citizens and aliens, to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; also, that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce
between the several states, with foreign nations and the Indian
tribes.
In a number of cases it was long contested whether the power
to regulate commerce included the power to regulate the navigation, by means of which the commerce was carried on ; that having
bee affirmatively settled, no other important question relative to
the -xtent of the power so conferred seems to have been brought
before the courts, and the learned commentators seem quite exclusively to have confined their treaties to that province of the power.
We confess, however, it seems to us by no means free from doubt,
whether that provision taken in connection with the others cited,
has not conferred upon Congress the power to pass all such laws
affecting commercial contracts between citizens of the different
states, and between citizens and aliens as may seem to them fit,
that such laws may affect the validity of the contract, its constuction and the obligation of parties under it-it other words, to
declare, as between the parties designated. a general conihercial
law, which shall he the lex loci throughout the United i3tate-.
And such power if once exercised would doubtless be deemed
exclusive.
It is from the same constitutional provisions that the power of
Congress over all matters maritime is derived; it has not perhaps
been questioned that Congress may enact any rule of decision in
matters maritime, however variant from the general maritime law.
and though this power lay dormant for many years, yet it was defi
nitively exercised in the passage of the Act of 1851, which we
believe has passed unchallenged by the profession. This is., however, aside from the present discussion. and is only suggested here
as likely to become a topic of no small intere-t when the question
with which this article is entitled shall again have passed into decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.
And in conclusion it is submitted, that the conception of any

